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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 05-1256
            





          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cr-315)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr.
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a),
September 12, 2006
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and BRIGHT,* Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 24, 2006)
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        OPINION OF THE COURT
         
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Calvin William challenges his conviction and sentence for being a felon
in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).  On appeal,
William argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the gun as
evidence obtained in connection with an illegal search.  We review the District Court’s
denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and
exercise plenary review of the District Court’s application of the law to those facts. 
United States v. Williams, 413 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005).  For the reasons that follow,
we will affirm William’s conviction and sentence.
I. Background
At approximately 6 p.m. on March 7, 2002, William went to a Philadelphia
convenience store owned by David Johnson and demanded to see Joseph Boyer, one of
Johnson’s former employees.  Johnson informed William that he did not know Boyer’s
whereabouts and that Boyer no longer worked for him.  Upset, William told Johnson that
he would return at 9 p.m., and that if Boyer was not at the store, or if Johnson did not pay
him the money that Boyer owed him, he would “shoot up” the store, and then go across
the street to Boyer’s grandmother’s house, drag her outside, and shoot her.  William then
3drove off.
Johnson immediately went to the local police precinct and filed a complaint.  After
the police interviewed him, Johnson returned to his home, which was located just above
the convenience store.  At approximately 7 p.m., two uniformed officers in a marked
police vehicle parked directly across from the convenience store and waited.  At about
8:50 p.m., the officers observed William drive up in a Ford Expedition, exit the vehicle,
and bang on Johnson’s door.  After William and Johnson exchanged a few words,
Johnson stepped out of the doorway toward the officers and pointed at William.  The
officers got out of their vehicle and arrested William for making terroristic threats, a
misdemeanor offense under Pennsylvania law.  A pat-down revealed a small quantity of
marijuana in William’s pants pocket.  The officers then instructed the two female
passengers who had been sitting in the Ford Expedition to exit the vehicle.  During a
search of the vehicle, officers found a loaded .380 caliber handgun wrapped in a black
knit skull cap in the center console between the driver and passenger seats.
A grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment
charging William with being a felon in possession of a firearm.  Prior to trial, William
filed a motion to suppress the gun seized from the Ford Expedition.  After a suppression
hearing, the District Court denied William’s motion, finding that (1) the search was
incident to a lawful arrest, and (2) in any event, the officers had probable cause to search
the vehicle.  On June 4, 2004, a jury returned a guilty verdict and William was
subsequently sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment for the firearms offense.
4II. Analysis
On appeal, William argues that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest
him for making terroristic threats; therefore, the officers’ search of the vehicle cannot be
justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest.  We do not agree.
The lawfulness of an arrest is determined by looking at the law of the state where
the arrest was made.  United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963)).  Under Pennsylvania law, an officer may carry
out a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor if the offense is committed in the presence of
the officer making the arrest.  Pa. R. Crim. P. 502; Meyers, 308 F.3d at 256 (citing
Commonwealth v. Clark, 735 A.2d 1248, 1251 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Bullers,
637 A.2d 1326, 1329 (Pa. 1994)).  A warrantless arrest is “‘reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is
being committed.’”  Wright v. Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 601 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004)).  
Officers arrested William for the misdemeanor offense of making terroristic
threats in violation of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2706.  Section 2706 provides, in
relevant part:
(a) A person commits the crime of terroristic threats if the person
communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to:     
     (1) commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another . . . .
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2706(a)(1).  In order to prove a violation of § 2706, the
evidence must show that (1) the defendant made a threat to commit a crime of violence;
5and (2) the threat was communicated with the intent of terrorizing another or with
reckless disregard for the risk of causing such terror.  Commonwealth v. Kelley, 664 A.2d
123, 127 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).  “[T]he harm sought to be prevented by the statute is the
psychological distress which follows from the invasion of another’s sense of personal
security.”  Commonwealth v. Hudgens, 582 A.2d 1352, 1358 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
“Neither the ability to carry out the threat nor the belief by the person threatened that it
will be carried out is an essential element of the crime.”  Commonwealth v. Anneski, 525
A.2d 373, 376 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). 
At the time of the arrest, the officers had a credible first-hand report that William
had threatened to “shoot up” Johnson’s store and shoot Boyer’s grandmother if William
did not receive the money that Boyers allegedly owed him; the officers witnessed William
return to the convenience store at almost precisely the time he told Johnson that he would
return to carry out the threat; the officers watched William confront Johnson in the
doorway of Johnson’s home, where the two men exchanged words; and, Johnson signaled
to the officers that William was the same person who had threatened him earlier in the
day.  In light of these circumstances, we have little trouble concluding that the arresting
officers had probable cause to believe that William had violated § 2706 when he returned
to see Johnson a second time  See Wright, 409 F.3d at 602 (“An arrest was made with
probable cause if ‘at the moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and circumstances
within the [officer’s] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the suspect] had
6committed or was committing an offense.’” (quoting United States v. Beck, 379 U.S. 89,
91 (1964)). 
William’s reliance on Myers in support of his argument that the officers did not
have probable cause to arrest him for making terroristic threats is entirely misplaced.  In
Myers, officers responded to a report of a domestic disturbance involving a gun and, upon
entering the defendant’s residence, heard a man and a woman arguing.  308 F.3d at 253. 
One of the officers went to the second floor of the apartment and found the defendant
hiding behind a door while a woman, who was visibly upset, stood nearby.  Id.  A
subsequent search of a duffel bag in the defendant’s possession revealed a handgun,
which was later introduced as evidence necessary to convict the defendant of a firearm
possession offense.  Id. at 254.  We held that these facts did not support the district
court’s conclusion that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant for simple
assault or domestic abuse; therefore, the search of the duffel bag could not be justified as
a search incident to a lawful arrest.  Id. at 258.  As we stated in Myers, “the only fair
interpretation of the [arresting officer]’s testimony is that he concluded that [defendant]
had been in a quarrel with [his wife], and that [defendant] had a gun.  That does not
establish a reasonable belief that [defendant] assaulted [his wife], and it certainly does not
establish any assault in the officer’s presence.”  Id.
The facts in this case are distinguishable from the facts presented in Myers.  As
previously discussed, it was reasonable for the officers to infer from what Johnson told
them and from what they witnessed that William had, while in the their presence,
7threatened Johnson with violence.  Accordingly, we reject William’s argument that his
arrest was unlawful. 
Moreover, even if William’s arrest was not incident to a lawful arrest, we agree
with the District Court that the officers’ search of the vehicle was nevertheless proper
under the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement.  See United States v.
Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 100-01 (3d Cir. 2002).  “The automobile exception to the warrant
requirement permits law enforcement to seize and search an automobile without a warrant
if ‘probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband.’” Id. at 100 (citing
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (3d Cir. 2002)).  For substantially the same
reasons that we concluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest William for
violation of § 2706 – Johnson’s report that William threatened to shoot up the store and
shoot Boyer’s grandmother; William’s return to the store several hours later as promised;
William’s second confrontation with Johnson; Johnson’s signal to the officers that
William was the same person who had threatened him earlier in the day; and the fact that
the pat-down revealed the presence of drugs – we also conclude that the officers had
probable cause to believe that there was a firearm or other contraband in the Ford
Expedition.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the District Court’s denial of the motion
to suppress and will affirm William’s conviction and sentence.
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